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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The employer is here sought to be joined under section 193,
subdivision 2, of the New York Civil Practice Act.' But, it is
claimed, since the indemnity sought arises from a separate instru-
ment, outside the action, that the statute does not apply. This calls
for an interpretation of the phrase "for the claim made against such
party in the action." This legislative ambiguity, if strictly construed,
limits the application to parties liable upon the exact complaint in
the action 2 and the rule would be rendered nugatory. But following
a line of cases 3 which have given some breadth to the law the court
here broadly interprets the statute as applying to all claims related to
the same subject matter. This despite the fact that the third person's
liability to defendant is based on contract while the original action
was for negligence.4 Such a construction appears to carry out the
purpose of the legislature by accepting "common questions of law
or fact" as the basis for joinder 5 rather than the old outmoded re-
quirement of liability directly to the plaintiff, or failing that, to the
defendant for contribution or indemnity directly under the plaintiff's
claim.6
D. J. R.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT
MoToRT.-Defendant, a non-resident, while operating an automo-
bile within the state collided with the plaintiff. Process was served
in accordance with section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.1
Upon the receipt appears the name of another. Defendant did not
deny she received a copy of the summons by registered mail, nor
did she allege she did not sign the receipt either personally or by
her agent. Defendant appeared specially to contest the jurisdiction
of the Court on the sole ground that the return receipt was insuffi-
cient upon its face, Held, the statute as construed does not require
the return receipt to be signed personally by the defendant, and in
1N. Y. Laws, 1923, c. 250, where any party to an action shows that
some third person * * * is or will be liable to such party * * * for the claim
made against the party in the action, the Court, on application of such
party, may order such person to be brought in as a party to the action * *
22 Carmody's New York Practise (1930) 874.
'Travlos v. Commercial Union of America, 217 App. Div. 352, 217 N.
Y. Supp. 459 (lst Dept., 1926); Prescott v. Nye, 223 App. Div. 356, 228 N.
Y. Supp. 156 (3rd Dept., 1928; Wichert & Co. v. Gallagher & Asher, 201
N. Y. Supp. 186 (1923) ; Driscoll v. Corwin, 133 Misc. 788, 233 N. Y. Supp.
483 (1929).
'But cf. Krombach v. Killian, 215 App. Div. 19, 213 N. Y. Supp. 138
(2nd Dept., 1925).
'Rothschild, The Consolidated Action, (1930) 4 St. John's L. Rev. 151.
167.
' May v. Mott Ave. Corp., 121 Misc. 398, 401, 201 N. Y. Supp. 189,
191 (1923).
'N. Y. Cons. Laws, Ch. 71.
RECENT DECISIONS
the absence of actual proof of lack of notice the return receipt will
suffice to give the Court jurisdiction. Shushereba v. Ames, 255
N. Y. 490, 175 N. E. 187 (1931).
The general rule is that process whether served outside of the
state or published within the state is without force to compel a non-
resident to present himself in a proceeding to establish a personal
liability.2 Jurisdiction over one is obtained by personal service of
process upon him within the state,3 or upon some one authorized
to receive service for him.4 Where the statute authorizes a different
method of service upon the resident the judgment is valid if the
method is one reasonably calculated to give him notice of the action
and an opportunity to be heard,9 and the same test of "reasonable
probability" of notice has been applied in the case of non-resident.6
It is universally conceded that a statute can not discriminate in a
hostile manner against a non-resident. Hence, in a recent case the
Court held, that where a statute provided for service 'upon the
secretary of the state in suits against non-residents, but provided for
no notice to the non-resident it was unconstitutional. 7 In such a
case it is obvious that when the test of "reasonable probability" of
notice is applied the statute must fall. The statute must make a
reasonable provision for such probable communication.8 Courts in
other jurisdictions are not in harmony with each other. Where the
statute provided that the process was to be mailed to the defendant
at his last known address it was held to be constitutional, 9 yet
where the statute provided that a copy of the process was to be
sent to the defendant's address as specified in the process it was
held invalid, since the address as specified may not be the true ad-
dress and may.lead to a perpetration of fraud.'0 The Court in the
latter case said that the statute fails to meet the test of "reasonable
probability" that a compliance with its terms would give the defen-
dant actual knowledge of the suit. It is to be noted that although
the defendant had received actual notice, the efficacy of the notice
to make her amenable to the suit for a personal judgment in this
Maryland case was made to depend on the constitutionality of the
statute and held that the validity of a statute is determined by what
may be done and not by what was done thereunder." The state's
2 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877).
' Scott, Jurisdiction Over a Non-Resident Motorist (1925), 39 Harv. L.
Rev. 563.
'Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, 15 Sup. Ct. 559 (1894).
Supra note 3.
°Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259 (1927).
7 lbid.
8 Ibid.
' Cronkhite v. Belden. 193 Wis. 145, 211 N. W. 916 (1927); Schilling v.
Odlebak, 177 Minn. 90, 224 N. W. 694 (1929).
10Grote v. Rogers, 149 At]. 547 (Md. 1930).
n Ibid.
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power to regulate the use of its highways extends to their use by
non-residents as well as by residents,12 and by virtue of such power
a state may condition a non-resident's privilege to operate an auto-
mobile within its territorial limits upon his appointment, express
or implied, of an agent to receive process.' 3 The statute in instant
case requires that the return receipt shall be filed along with the
affidavit of compliance and the summons and complaint in the court
in which the action is commenced. It is to be noted that it is the
return receipt and not the ordinary post office receipt that must be
filed. The return receipt is something of an admission of service.
It is not necessary that the receipt shall bear his personal signa-
ture. 14 It is substantial compliance if the person signing had au-
thority.15 The statute in question is constitutional.'0 It appears that
defendant had knowledge of the receipt of such papers. There
has been substantial compliance. The aperture through which the
defendant is trying to escape is too narrow.
j.M. P.
REAL PROPERTY-LAND HELD UNDER PASSIVE TRUST NOT
SUBJECT TO LIEN FOR FRANCHISE TAx.-Charter Construction
Company, pursuant to an agreement whereby plaintiffs, its stock-
holders, surrendered to it their stock, transferred certain real prop-
erty to the Glenbrook Company which took an undivided interest for
the benefit of plaintiffs. The state levied a franchise tax on the
Glenbrook Company. Plaintiffs seek to bar the state from assert-
ing a lien on the property in question. On appeal, from a judgment
for defendant, Held, reversed. A property tax assessed on a cor-
poration cannot become a lien upon land as to which it was a mere
depositary of the legal title. Plaintiffs herein sustained the burden
imposed by section 501 of the Real Property Law of establishing
their legal title. Bing v. People, 254 N. Y. 484, 173 N. E. 687
(1930)."
Where no trust duty is imposed by the deed upon the grantee
it is a mere passive trust and the fee passes directly to the benefi-
ciaries named therein.' A person who claims an interest in real
property not less than a ten-year term must set forth in his com-
plaint the estate he claims to have.2 A franchise tax is not a prop-
'Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 59 L. Ed. 385 (1914).
"Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30 (1916).
" Gesell v. Wells, 229 App. Div. 11, 240 N. Y. Supp. 628 (3rd Dept. 1930).
Ibid.
16Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1926).
'Fisher v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416 (1869); Dennison et al v. Dennison, 185
N. Y. 438, 78 N. E. 162 (1906) ; Jacoby v. Jacoby, 188 N. Y. 124, 80 N. E.
676 (1907); N. Y. Real Property Law (1909) Ch. 52, Sec. 93.
2 Best Renting Co. v. City of N. Y., 248 N. Y. 491, 162 N. E. 497 (1928);
N. Y. Real Property Law (1920) Ch. 930, Sec. 501.
